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Abstract 
This paper considers a mixed Cournot duopoly model comprising a private firm and a 
partially privatized public firm to reassess the effect of an increase in ambient charges, 
and compares the result of this study with that obtained from private Cournot duopoly 
competition. The paper demonstrates that our result is about the same as that of private 
Cournot duopoly competition. 
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1. Introduction 
  The analysis by Ganguli and Raju (2012) examines the effect of an increase in ambient 
charges as a policy measure for reducing industrial non-point source pollution in two 
Bertrand duopoly games. In the first game, the regulator first announces the ambient 
charge and then both firms simultaneously and independently choose their prices. The 
pollution abatement technologies are assumed to be fixed. In the second game, the 
regulator first announces the ambient charge. Second, both firms simultaneously and 
independently choose their pollution abatement technologies. Third, they simultaneously 
and independently set their prices. Ganguli and Raju demonstrate that in each game an 
increase in the ambient charge leads to more pollution. In addition, Sato (2017) 
investigates the effect of an increase in ambient charges in the context of Cournot 
competition and demonstrates that an increase in the ambient charge can lead to less 
pollution as opposed to Bertrand duopoly competition. These studies consider private 
duopoly game models. 
  In the present paper, we consider a mixed Cournot duopoly model comprising a private 
firm and a partially privatized public firm to reassess the effect of an increase in ambient 
charges.
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 We compare the result of this study with that of private Cournot duopoly 
                                                 
1
 The seminal paper by Fershtman (1990) investigated a mixed Cournot duopoly model 
comprising a private firm and a partially privatized state-owned firm. Since then, the 
theoretical analysis of partial privatization of state-owned public firms has been 
conducted by many researchers (e.g., Matsumura, 1998; Chang, 2005; Chao and Yu, 
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competition obtained by Sato (2017). 
  The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, the model is 




2. The model 
  There is a market comprising a private firm (firm 1) and a partially privatized firm 
(firm 0) that is jointly owned by both the public and private sectors. Both firms produce 
perfectly substitutable goods. There is no possibility of entry or exit. The production 
quantity of firm ( 0,1)i i is represented as iq . The market price is determined by the 
following inverse demand function: 
0 1 0 1( , ) ( )p q q a q q , where a  represents a 
constant and 
0 1a q q . The total amount of pollution generated by both firms is given 
by 0 0 1 1E e q e q , where (0, )ie  represents firm i's pollution abatement technology. 
  Firm i’s profit is given by 
  0 1 0 1 0 0 1 1( , ) ( , )i i i iq q p q q q c q m e q e q E ,                           (1) 
where (0, )ic  denotes firm i's marginal cost of production and E  is the 
environmental standard. If 0 0 1 1e q e q E , then the regulator of the government will give 
                                                                                                                                               
2006; Lu and Poddar, 2007; Saha and Sensarma, 2008; Artz, Heywood and McGinty, 
2009; Wang, Wang and Zhao, 2009; Ohnishi, 2010, 2016; Scrimitore, 2014; Chen, 2017; 
Fridman, 2018). 
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both firms a subsidy of m  times the difference between E  and 0 0 1 1e q e q , whereas if 
0 0 1 1e q e q E , then the firms will be penalized by 0 0 1 1m e q e q E . Firm 1 seeks 
to maximize (1). 
  Social welfare is given by 
  
0 1 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 1 1
0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 1 1
( , ) ( , ) ( , ) ( , ) 2
    ( , ) ( , ) ( , ) ,
W q q CS q q q q q q m e q e q E
CS q q p q q c q p q q c q
            (2) 
where 
21
0 1 0 12
( , )CS q q q q  represents consumer surplus. 
  Firm 0’s objective function is given by 
  
0 0 1 0 1 0 0 1
2
0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1
0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 1
( , ) ( , ) (1 ) ( , )
1
       
2
          1 ,
U q q W q q q q
q q a q q q c q a q q q c q
a q q q c q m e q e q E
   (3) 
where  denotes the level of privatization. If 0 , firm 0 is purely private, while if 
1 , it is purely public. We assume that (0,1) . That is, we consider the case of 
mixed duopoly competition in which firm 0 is neither purely private nor purely public. 
 
 
3. Main result 
  In this section, we present the result of the model described in the previous section. 
From (1), we derive firm 1’s best response function: 
  
1 1 1 0
0( )
2
a c me q
BR q .                                           (4) 
In addition, we derive firm 0’s best response function from (3): 
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a c me q
BR q .                                       (5) 
Therefore, we obtain the Cournot equilibrium outputs: 
  
0 1 0 1*
0





1 2 1 2
.
3 2
a c c m e e
q
a c c m e e
q
                    (6) 
Furthermore, the industrial emission quantity can be calculated as: 
2
0 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 0 1* *
0 0 1 1
1 2 2 1 2
.
3 2
a e e c e c e c e me e c m e e
e q e q
                 (7) 
This is a function of the policy parameter m . Therefore, we denote * *0 0 1 1e q e q  as a 
function ( )E m  and differentiate ( )E m  by m : 
  
2 2 2 2
0 1 0 1 0 0 1 12 2
( )
3 2
e e e e e e e e
E m .                             (8) 
  The main result of this study is summarized in the following proposition. 
 
Proposition 1: In the mixed Cournot duopoly model comprising firm 0 and firm 1, (i) 
( )E m  is always negative if 0 1e e , and (ii) ( )E m  is not always negative if 0 1e e . 
 
Proof: (i) We first prove that if 0 1e e , then ( ) 0E m . Suppose that 0 1e e e . Then 






E m .                                                 (9) 
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This case follows since (0,1) . 
  Next, we prove that if 0 1e e , then ( ) 0E m . Since 0 1e e  and (0,1) , the 
following inequality holds. 
  2 20 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 12 2 2 0e e e e e e e e e  
  2 2 20 0 02 2 2 1 0e e e  
Hence, Proposition 1 (i) is proved. 
(ii) We show that if 0 1e e , then ( )E m  is not always negative. We provide the 
following two numerical examples. We first assume that 0 5e , 1 2e  and 0.5 . If 
these values are substituted into equation (8), then: 
  




  Next, if 0 2e , 1 1e  and 0.9 , then: 
  




Thus, Proposition 1 (ii) is true. Q.E.D. 
 
  Notice that the result of this study when 0 1e e  is consistent with that obtained from 





  We have examined a mixed Cournot duopoly model comprising a private firm and a 
partially privatized public firm to reassess the effect of an increase in ambient charges. We 
have demonstrated that, if the pollution abatement technology of the partially privatized 
public firm is equal to or less than that of the private firm, then an increase in the ambient 
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